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BLACKHOLE IN CYBERSPACE:
THE LEGAL VOID IN THE
INTERNET
by ALEXANDER GIGANTEt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most people surf the Internet with little concern about who governs
cyberspace or how those governing derive their authority to make decisions regarding domain names, Internet Protocols, and other Internet
administrative matters. However, Internet governance promises to be
an area of increasing interest for lawyers because of the convergence of
two trends. On the one hand, with the Internet growing as a commercial
medium, decisions about its structure, administration and function will
more frequently affect and raise legal issues concerning commercial
property rights. On the other hand, the Internet's growing commercial
success is prompting the federal government to withdraw from further
participation in and support of Internet governance, the existing Internet governing bodies may soon find themselves without a colorable
legal basis for their claimed authority over the Internet. This looming
legal void could swallow the Internet into a black hole of litigation unless
the legal community devises some creative solutions to place Internet
governance on stable footing.1
II.

THE INTERNET: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The first linking of computers in a network began in 1969 as a project sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency ("ARPA") of
the Department of Defense ("DOD"). 2 DOD wanted a system that alt Copyright © 1997.
1. See NICHOLAS BARAN, INSME THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY REVOLUTION 41
(1995) (stating that, "with government finding for the Internet beginning to dry up, it

seems inevitable that intense commercial activity will drive control of the Internet into the
private sector"). Robert Shaw, Internet Domain Names: Whose Domain is This? (visited
Feb. 1, 1997) <httpJ/www.itu.int/intreg/dns.html>.

2. ARPA is today known as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
("DARPA"). See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (visited Feb. 1997) <httpJ/
www.arpa.mil>.
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lowed linked computers to communicate via alternate routes to enable
the network to continue functioning even if some computers in the link
were out of service.3 The network ("ARPANet") soon developed beyond
the scope originally envisioned to include many university networks. 4
Consequently, in 1987 the National Science Foundation ("NSF") entered
the field by establishing a new network ("NSFNet") as a "backbone" into
which other networks could link.5 By the early 1990s, the NSF had
opened the NSFNet to commercial users and the general public, result6
ing in the Internet that exists today.
The constant underlying this evolution in computer networking is
the TCP/IP protocol, which was perfected in 1982 for ARPA by Internet
pioneers Vint Cerf, Bob Kahn, and others. TCP/IP has three key features that make "internetting" possible:
(1) computers using different operating systems can communicate
with each other;
(2) each transmission is broken up into digital packets of a few thousand bytes; and
(3) each digital packet is routed dynamically, i.e., each packet is separately directed to its destination along the route the network determines is most convenient for that packet at the time it arrives for
7
forwarding.
3. The "creation myth" of the Internet teaches that DOD wanted a network that could
survive a nuclear attack severing some of the linked computers. See, e.g, G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 31 (1995); JOHN R. LEViNE & CAROL BARouDI,
THE INTERNET FOR DuMMIEs 12 (2d ed. 1994); see also Mag. of Fantasy,Science and Fiction

(visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'/www.utep.edu/-comm/cmc/nethist.html>. However, recent
scholarship casts doubt on this Cold War scenario and suggests more benignly that DOD
simply wanted a network sufficiently flexible to permit information sharing without constant shutdowns. See KATIE HAFNER & MATTEw LYON, WHERE WIzARDs STAY Up LATE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 9-10 (1996).
4. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 3, at 249; LEVrNE & BAROuI, supra note 3, at 12.
5. BARAN, supra note 1, at 39-40. The NSF's basic charter directs it to foster the

development of computer technologies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1861(a)(4), 1861(b). In addition, the
High-Performance Computing Act ("HPCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 5501 et seq., authorizes the
NSF-along with other federal agencies-to promote the development of network computing in cooperation with private network providers and the private computer and telecommunications industries.
6. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 3, at 253-54, 257-58; LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 3,

at 13-14.
7. In this aspect, TCP/IP differs critically from telephony, which uses a dedicated circuit between two telephones for the duration of each telephone communication. BARAN,
supra note 1, at 38-39. With dynamic routing, the digital packet does not require a dedicated circuit connected to the destination terminal, but instead travels the circuit most
suitable at any particular instant. Id. Thus, the digital packets comprising a single transmission in theory could all travel different routes before being reassembled at their destination as text or image. Id. See also Henry Perritt, Dispute Resolution in Electronic
Network Communities, 38 VILL. L. REv. 349, 352 n.7 (1993). "Dynamic routing means that
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The TCP/IP protocol assigns each computer in the network a unique
Internet Protocol ("I1") address which is analogous to a telephone
number consisting of four groups (called octets) of integers separated by
dots, each octet being an integer between zero and 255.8 However, from
early on, network users preferred names instead of numbers. 9 Thus,
each numeric IP corresponds to a mnemonic domain name.1 0 Each pairing of an IP numeric and a domain name is unique, i.e., only one computer site in the network can have a particular domain name." The
approximately four billion IP addresses mathematically possible with
this system (255' = 24.23 billion) are sometimes called the "name space"
or "address space."'
When a user types in a domain name, a "domain name server" translates it into the corresponding IP numeric and then sends the numeric to
the "root server" that holds the identifying information for domain
names in the root server's top-level domain ("TLD").' 3 For example,
<www.jmls.edu> is in the .edu TLD. Typing in the <www.jmls.edu> domain name sends its corresponding IP numeric1 4 to the .edu root server.
The root server returns a message identifying the "authoritative name
server," which is the server hosting the particular site within the TLD.
In the example, The John Marshall Law School is the server hosting
<www.jmls>. The user's computer is then put into contact with the site
the path that a particular message takes-and sometimes different parts of the same
message-is not predetermined. Rather, at the time the computer establishes the path for
a particular message it simultaneously determines what path would be most efficient." Id.
8. MARGARET LEvINE YOUNG & JOHN R. LEVINE, INTERNET FAQs 33 (1995); Paul
Mockapetris, Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://
ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc882.txt>.
9. HAFNER AND LYON, supra note 3, at 252-53; William A. Foster, Registering the Do-

main Name System: An Exercise in Global Decision Making (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://
ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/foster.html>.
10. The IP numeric address and domain name for the John Marshall Law School home
page are, respectively, 192.207.162.250 and <www.jmls.edu>. Entering either the numeric
IP address or the mnemonic domain name at the <http.//> prompt will bring the user to the
home page.
11. Jon Postel, New Registries and the Delegation of InternationalTop Level Domains,
A.1.1 (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <ftp'//ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/administration /new-registries>
(Oct. 1996 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority).
12. Caitlin Remby, Networking Acronyms at a Glance, PC WEEK, Feb. 19, 1996, at N17;
Royal Van Horn, PHi DELTA KAPPAN, Mar. 1995, at 572.
13. LEVINE & YOUNG, supra note 8, at 33; Ed Bott, What's in a Name?, PC COMPUTING,
Oct. 1996, at 341. Reading a domain name from right to left, the first component is the
TLD that describes the purpose of the entity (e.g., .com for a commercial owner, .edu for an
educational organization, etc.) owning the second-level domain immediately to the left of
the "dot" setting off the TLD. DNS Background Materials:Suggested Reading (visited Feb.
1, 1997) <http'/rs.internic.net/help/domain/dns.html>.
14. See supra note 10.
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identified by the domain name. 15
A.

THE INTERNET GROUPS

Several engineering groups formed to administer the network's
evolution under the auspices of DARPA and, later, the NSF. In recent
years these "founder groups" have been joined by several new groups, as
the Internet community tries to keep pace with the Internet's rapid
evolution.
1.

Founder Groups

The founder groups continue to function today and are the main decision-making bodies with regard to the TCP/IP protocol, the domainname system, and all other aspects of the Internet's governance.
a.

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("IANA")

IANA is a division of the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California. Jon Postel, another Internet pioneer, has
headed IANA since its inception. It is the clearinghouse for assigning
and coordinating the use of so-called Internet parameters, such as Internet addresses and domain names. 16 IANA claims the authority "to
supervise and control the creation and management aspects of the iTLDs
[International Top-Level Domains]. '1 7 DARPA has been the primary
source of IANA's funding, today accounting for about 90% of IANA's
budget.18
b.

Internet Domain Names Review Board ("IDNB")

IANA has conferred on the IDNB coordinate jurisdiction to review
from either
disputes concerning domain-name registries. 19 An appeal
20
IANA or the IDNB goes to the Internet Society ("ISOC").
15. Bott, supra note 13, at 341.
16. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://
www.isi.edu/iana/overview.html>. See also Vint Cerf LAB Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identifies Assignment and LAB Recommended Policy Change to Internet Connected Status, 1.2 (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'/ds.internic.net/ rfc/rfcll74.txt>.
5.1. See supra note 13 for a description of TLDs.
17. Postel, supra note 11,
18. E-mail from Jon Postel to author (transmitted Nov. 9, 1996) (on file with the author
and with the John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law). See also Gigabit
Network Communications Research (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'//www.ito.darpa.mil/Summaries95/8420-USCISIGigNetCom.html>.
19. Postel, supra note 11, 5.1. Alternatively, LANA may hear the appeal itself. See
also Jon Postel, Domain Name System Structure & Delegation (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'J/
ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1591.txt>.
20. Postel, supra note 11, $ 5.3. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.a. (describing ISOC),
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c. Internet Architecture Board ("LAB")
The IAB develops guidelines for research into problems with and improvements in the Internet's architecture. 2 1 The IAB members are the
Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF") Chair plus twelve other trustees selected by the IETF nominating committee and approved by
ISOC.22

d. Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF")
The IETF is comprised of working groups of engineers and other
technicians focusing on specific issues identified by the IAB. 23 The IETF
has an Internet Engineering Steering Group ("IESG"), made up of IETF
area directors and the IETF Chair, who handles the IETF's internal
management. 2 4 The IAB appoints the IESG and Chair from a list submitted by the IETFs nominating committee. 2 5 The IETF also receives
support from DARPA. 2 6 The IETF Secretariat is the IETF's administrative body, 2 7 receiving support from various Internet organizations. 28
The NSF funds the Secretariat through grants. 29
e. Internet Research Task Force ("IRTF")
The IAB "sponsors and organizes" the IRTF3 0 which, in contrast
with the IETF, focuses on more long-term, abstract networking
problems.a1 The IRTF also has a steering group, the Internet Research
21. Brian Carpenter, What Does the IAB Do, Anyway? (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <httpi/l
www.iab.org/iab/connexions.html>.
22. Charter of the Internet Architecture Board, $ 1.1 (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://
ds.internic.net/rfc/rfcl60l.txt>.
23. The OrganizationsInvolved in the IETFStandardsProcess, 9 3.1, 3.2, 3.6 (visited
Feb., 1997) <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2028.txt>.
24. Id. 1 3.5. Like IANA, the IETF Chair operates out of the Information Sciences
Institute at the University of Southern California. Gigabits Networthy Research Project
(visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'//www.isi.edu/div7/infra/nia-home.html>.
25. Supra note 23, 9 3.6; LAB Charter, supra note 22, 9 2.
26. ARPA Support for the IETF (ASI) Project (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www.isi.edu/
div7/giga/asi.html>; 1995 Project Summaries, ARPA Support for the IETF (ASI) (visited
Feb. 1, 1997) <http//www.ito.darpa.mil/Summaries95/8420-USC_ISI_IETF.html>.
27. Supra note 23, $ 3.3.
28. In particular, "[t]he Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI) runs the

IETF Secretariat with funding from the US government." Internet EngineeringTask Force
(visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'//www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/home.html>.
29. IETF Secretariat(visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'//www.ietf.org/secretariat.html>; Don
Mitchell et al., In Whose Domain:Name Service in Adolescence (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http'J
/ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/bradner.html>.
30. See supra note 22, $ 2.2.
31. See supra note 23, T 3.8; see also IRTF ResearchGroup Guidelines & Procedures,T
1 (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc20l4.txt>.
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32
Steering Group ("IRSG"), to oversee the IRTF's work and organization.

2. New Groups
In addition to these founder groups, several new organizations have
become important in Internet governance in recent years:
a. The Internet Society ("ISOC")
ISOC is a non-profit corporation formed in Washington, D.C. in
1992. 3 3 ISOC's stated goal is to foster global cooperation and coordina-

tion on Internet issues. Its members are companies, government agencies, foundations and individuals involved in Internet development and
innovation. Since ISOC's formation, other Internet organizations have
34
accepted it as the over-arching Internet authority.
b.

Corporationfor National Research Initiatives ("CNRI")

CNRI, another non-profit corporation, endeavors to "help focus U.S.
strengths in information processing technology."3 5 DARPA and the NSF
have provided CNRI with substantial funding. CNRI is also a charter
member of ISOC.
c. Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSF)
NSI is a private corporation that registers domain names in the .corn
TLD under a 1993 cooperative agreement with the NSF. 36 In registering

domain names, NSI operates within the parameters established by
LANA for the .corn TLD. NSI and ATT, which perform Internet directory
cooperative agreement, together form the
functions under another NSF
37
entity known as InterNIC.
32. See supra note 23; see also supra note 31.
33. See Frequently Asked Questions: What is the Internet Society? (last updated Aug.
14, 1995) <http://info.isoc.org:80/whatis/what-is-isoc.html>.
34. See, e.g., supra note 28 (describing the IESG as operating "under the auspices of
the Internet Society"). Sometimes an organization that existed for years before ISOC's formation is even incongruously described as "chartered" by ISOC. Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http'//www.isi.edu/iana/overview.html> (providing an
overview of the LANA); IETF Home Page (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http//www.ietf.org/
home.html> (describing IANA as chartered by ISOC and the Federal Networking Council).
But see Christian Huitema, LAB Charter,T 2.4 (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <httpJ/ds.internic.net/
rfc/rfcl60l.txt> (stating that the AB shall designate an Internet Assigned Numbers Authority "to administer the assignment of Internet Protocol numbers").
35. The Corporation for National Research Initiative (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <httpJ/
www.cnri.reston.va.us/>.
36. NSF Cooperative Agreement Table of Contents (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <httpJ/
rs.internic.net/nsf/agreement/>.
37. See About the InterNIC (last modified Apr. 1, 1996) <httpJ/rs.internic.net/internic/>.
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d. FederalNetworking Council (aFNC")
The FNC is a council comprised of seventeen federal agencies interested in or affected by computer networking.3 8 Although the FNC has
existed in some form since the mid-1980's, 3 9 it now operates under the
auspices of the Committee on Information and Communications ("CIC")
of President Clinton's National Science & Technology Council
("NSTC"). 40 Many of the other Internet organizations are supported by
41
the FNC with funding or FNC participation.
e.

InternationalAd Hoc Committee ("IAHC")
The IAHC was formed in November, 1996 by the ISOC, the IANA,
the IAB, the FNC, the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") and the
International Trademark Association ("INTA") to deal with the domain
name system on an international level.
B. THE ORGANIZATION
A diagram of all these organizations and groups and their real or
purported relationships would thus look something like the following:

38. The Federal Networking Council (last updated Jan. 14, 1997) <httpJ/www.
fnc.gov>.
39. Mike St. Johns, FNC's Role in the DNS Issue (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http//
ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/fnc.html>.
40. Executive Order No. 12881, 58 F.R. 62491, Nov. 23, 1993, establishing the NSTC.
See statement of John C. Toole, Director of the CIC's National Coordination Office for High
Performance Computing and Communications, before the Subcommittee on Basic Research
of the House Committee on Science, Oct. 31, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 11597736 (regarding the FNC's relationship with the CIC).
41. Mitchell et al., supra note 29; St. Johns, supra note 39.
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This convoluted structure is surprising, given the collective engineering genius involved in all these organizations. However, there may
be a method to this madness. Someone described as a key participant in
the Internet community once confided that the community likes this
42
Rube Goldberg nightmare because "we want to keep things murky."
A penchant for organizational murkiness probably reflects the desire
of many Internet technocrats to keep their Internet out of the hands of
42. See Network Solutions Says Name Policy is "Not Subject to Review," INFO. L.
May 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8913600.

ALERT,
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newly arrived cyber-businessmen and their lawyers. 43 Yet, something
more may be at play than simple nostalgia for the days when the Internet was the exclusive province of those who could master the quirks of
Unix, the Internet's lingua franca. 44 A murky organizational picture
also can hide flaws in an organization's legal structure.
In apparent recognition of these flaws, IANA has been calling for a
"legal umbrella" under which it can operate. 45 This new concern about
establishing a legal cover for the Internet's organization derives from the
federal government's plan to withdraw from active participation in the
46
Internet's administration.
When DARPA and later the NSF controlled the Internet, these sponsoring agencies provided the necessary authority for the ad hoc groups to
allocate among themselves jurisdiction over the various operational aspects of the federal government's computer network. Although some in
the Internet community seem to believe, mistakenly, that the FNC's participation in Internet governance continues to provide the desired "legal

umbrella,"4 7 the FNC-an administrative convenience, not a statutory
agency-has no power to authorize the activities of the Internet
groups. 4 8 Moreover, the FCC, the one federal agency with apparent statutory authority to provide such an umbrella, see e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
43. See, e.g., Roberts, The Future of Internet Infrastructures (visited Jan. 21, 1997)

<httpl//ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/roberts.html>; The NSF/DNCRI and Harvard Information
Infrastructure Project, Internet Names, Numbers and Beyond: Issues in the Coordination,
Privatization,and Internationalizationof the Internet (hereinafter "1995 Harvard Project"),
Nov. 20, 1995 (visited Jan. 21, 1997) <http:/ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/nsfminl.html> (including the remarks of Paul Mockapetris); David W. Maher, Trademarks on the Internet:
Who's in Charge?, (visited Feb. 5, 1997) <http://aldea.com/cix/maher.html> (describing the
Internet as "an academic, government, and military network which merely tolerates commercial and private user interests").
44. 1995 Harvard Project, supra note 43 (including the remarks of Paul Mockapetris).
"The Internet is no longer restricted to a small group of us who wrote some code. It's not
ours anymore and we have to get over that." Id.
45. See, e.g., Postel, supra note 11,
1.5.3, 2.1, 5.3. Foster, supra note 9, at 2 (regarding ISOC providing a legal umbrella for the IETF, the IESG, the IAB and IANA).
46. See Mitchell et al., supra note 29, at 2; St. Johns, supra note 39; Draft Minutes of
the Federal Networking Council Advisory Committee (FNCAC) Meeting, Apr. 8 & 9, 1996,
(visited Jan. 24, 1997) <httpJ/www.fnc.gov/ FNCAC_4_96_minutes.html>.
47. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (last modified Oct. 11, 1996) <http://
www.isi.edu/iana/overview.html> (describing the FNC as one of the two agencies (the
other being ISOC) "chartering" LANA); see also Internet Engineering Task Force (visited
Feb. 1, 1997) <http./www.ietf.org/home.html> (stating also that the FNC and ISOC are the
two agencies "chartering" IANA).
48. See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations Bd., 464
U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (stating that courts will not allow "unauthorized assumption by an
agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress").
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152, has repeatedly refused to enter the field. 4 9 The separate statement
of then FCC Chairman Ferris in one of the Computer II proceedings illustrates the FCC's laissez-faire attitude toward computer networking:
Today we have removed the barricades from the door to the information
age. The supply of communications products and services will be limited only by the ingenuity of businessmen and scientists. Government
will no longer be a barrier that prevents or delays the introduction of
innovations in technology.
As long as the development of new telecommunications products was
subject to the whim of the regulatory process, however, the evolution of
this industry was subject to uncertainty. Now communications business entrepreneurs can be sure50that the marketplace and not the government will decide their fate.
In summary, the FCC's abstention from network regulation, the NSF/
DARPA's withdrawal from Internet governance, and the government's
invitation to private industry to assume responsibility for the Internet's
future,5 1 mean that the existing Internet groups will
no longer have any
52
foundation of federal authority for their activities.
What is occurring is without precedent. Earlier in this century, the
radio industry developed without active participation by the national
government, but the government then stepped in to regulate when required by the public interest. 53 More recently, in the post-war period,
the federal government gave private industry significant government-developed nuclear technology, but without relinquishing regulatory oversight. 54 In the case of the Internet, the federal government is in effect
turning over to the private sector a communications network developed
almost exclusively with government funding, without retaining any regulatory control.
For the time being, the Internet organization remains in place even
while its foundation of federal authority erodes. The Internet groups
with their talented engineers and technicians have built a large reservoir of goodwill with the brilliance of their achievement. Thus, for the
most part, the private sector has been inclined to acquiesce in their continued administration of the Internet. However, this pax cybernetica is
unlikely to last. The increasing commercialization of the Internet means
that technical and administrative decisions will have ever greater im49. See, e.g., California v. F.C.C., 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Computer & Commu-

nications Indus. Ass'n v. F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affg 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980),
84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) and 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981) (collectively known as Computer II).
50. 77 F.C.C.2d at 384.
51. Id. See also Mitchell et al., supra note 29; St. Johns, supra note 39.
52. See Mitchell et al., supra note 29; Maher, supra note 43.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 120-26.
54. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1983).
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pact on legal rights.5 5 Eventually, the Internet organizations will face
56
challenges to their authority.
A.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INTERNET GROUPS

The kinds of challenges that the Internet groups might confront will
depend on what the courts determine to be their legal status in any particular case. In some instances, the grounds might exist for treating an
Internet group as a state actor, i.e., a government surrogate. For example, the federal government has never explicitly renounced its claim that
it "owns" the name space for Internet addresses,5 7 and some in the Internet community have characterized the Internet groups as "agents" or
"custodians" of the federal government with respect to the name space. 58
If a court were to hold that the name space belonged to the United States
government, IANA and NSI might be deemed state actors insofar as they
were "managing" federal property.5 9 In allowing the various groups to
administer the Internet, the federal government is acquiescing in their
regulation of a channel of interstate and foreign commerce-a traditional constitutionally based governmental function-which might be
another ground for invoking the state-action doctrine. 60 IANA's almost
exclusive reliance on DARPA funding may carry it across the state actor
threshold. 6 1 NSI may be a state actor with respect to its domain-dis62
putes policy promulgated with the NSF's approval.
55. Shaw, supra note 1, at 13.
56. Shaw, supra note 1, at 14; Maher, supra note 43.
57. See St. Johns, supra note 39 ("Although the InterNIC performs the registrar function, it does this as an agent of the U.S. government and does not own the space nor does it
own the registration data"); 1995 Harvard Project, supra note 43 (including the remark of
Mark Corbitt, "The U.S. government has ownership as a public trust"). See also supra text
accompanying note 12 regarding the "name space."
58. St. Johns, supra note 39 (characterizing "agents"); 1995 Harvard Project, supra
note 43 (including the remarks of Vint Cerf depicting "custodians"). See also Final Report
of the InternationalAd Hoc Committee: Recommendations for Administrationand Management ofgTLD's, Executive Summary, (visited Feb. 19, 1997) <http-/www.iahc.org/draftiahc-recommend-00.html> (hereinafter "IAHC Final Report" declaring that "[the Internet
top level domain space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust"). See also
infra text accompanying notes 78 and 79 (describing the IAHC).
59. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
60. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621; but see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (holding that the private actor's virtually total dependence on government funding is
not, by itself, sufficient to invoke state-action doctrine).
62. See Roadrunner Computer Sys., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-413-A (E.D.
Va. 1996), NSI Answer $ 13 and NSI Counterclaim
4 <http/www.patents.com/
nsians.sht> (acknowledging that NSF approves NSI's policy regarding domain-name disputes). However, "[Weere approval... of the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient
.. " to transmute private conduct into state action. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-
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On the other hand, where the courts treat the Internet groups as
private actors, they will be subject to the same legal risks as other private entities. These groups no longer will enjoy the privilege of being
shielded by the federal government from legal responsibility for their actions. Moreover, irrespective of the status of the various Internet groups
under United States law, the Internet's global character could expose the
63
groups to legal liability beyond the borders of the United States.
B. THE CoNrENious DoMAJN NAME SYSTEM

The domain name system ("DNS"), which has already produced
many disputes, is the most likely area in which these issues will arise. 64
Most disputes to date have concerned competing claims of trademark
rights in domain names. The inherent limitations in the DNS's requirement of domain-name uniqueness conflict with real-world trademark
law's tolerance of multiple users of commercial names. 6 5 The growing
05 (1982). Moreover, the NSI/NSF Cooperative Agreement (see supra note 36) is silent
regarding the resolution of domain-name disputes, obviating the argument that NSI is a
state actor because the NSF "encouraged" NSI's disputes policy. See 457 U.S. at 1004
(holding that a state action can arise when government "has provided. . . significant encouragement, either overt or covert," for the private conduct). See also Flagg Bros., 436
U.S. at 164-65. On the other hand, the Cooperative Agreement's failure to include a dueprocess procedure to resolve domain-name disputes might warrant a finding of state action,
because a government agency, like the NSF, may not evade the Constitution by contractually delegating duties to a private entity if the agency can by the contract require the private entity to conform its behavior to constitutional standards. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
Alternatively, NSI's policy may constitute state action by virtue of the fact that the
Cooperative Agreement gives it a monopoly on registrations in the .com TLD. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (holding that the private defendant's conduct was a state action
where, pursuant to government contract, the defendant was sole the source of services giving rise to plaintiffs claim). NSI could also be a state actor if it were found to be performing
a traditional governmental function. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621; Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966). In this regard, the statute providing the authority for the Cooperative
Agreement is enlightening as to the governmental character of NSI's services:
An executive agency shall use a cooperative agreement reflecting a relationship
between the United States Government and a... recipient when(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to
the.. .recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized
by a law of the United States... ; and

(2) substantial involvement is expected between the executive agency and the...
recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.
31 U.S.C. § 6305 (1983).
63. Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway: ForeignLiability
for Domestically Created Content, 14 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 523 (1996) (regarding possible international liability arising from Internet transmissions).
64. See Index of lcfinternic/recent (visited Jan. 21, 1997) <httpJ/www.ll.georgetown.
edu/Ic/internic/recent> for a comprehensive survey of domain-name disputes.
65. See, e.g., Mark Voorhees, Network Solutions to Rework Policy Governing Internet
Domain Names (last modified Apr. 19, 1996) <http://infolawalert.com/stories/
041996b.html>; Alexander Gigante, "Domain-ia" The Growing Tension Between the Do-
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commercialization of the Internet will generate similar litigation.
1.

Domain Name Conflicts

The Internet community's response to these issues has been disappointing. NSI has a Domain Name Disputes Policy6 6-the current version being the fourth promulgated in a little over a year-that allows
NSI to arbitrarily suspend a domain name in certain situations, notwithstanding that the domain name holder may have invested time and
money in developing goodwill in the name.6 7 Moreover, NSI's policy fails
to address the potential international problems arising from registrations in the .com TLD. In particular, because .com is a so-called international Top-Level Domain ("iTLD"), 68 anyone in the world can register a
name in that domain, holding out the prospect of international trademark disputes where different parties have separate, valid registrations
in the same name in their respective countries. 69 Perhaps representing
the proverbial tip of the iceberg, a German court has already ruled that a
name appearing on an American Internet site infringed a registered
trademark in Germany. 70 The respective North American and European
main Name System and Trademark Law (visited Jan. 21, 1997) <http://
ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/gigante.html> (advocating changes in the DNS and illustrating
the existing problems).
66. Network Solutions Domain Name Dispute Policy (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <ftp'//
rs.internic.netpolicy/internic/internic-domain-6.txt>.
67. See Trademark/Internet/Domain Names/New NSI Policy, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Nov. 1996, at 11 (reporting on Juno Online Services, L.P. v. Juno Lighting Inc., Case
No. 96-1505A (E.D. Va. 1996), where the non-competing defendant trademark owner tried
to obtain suspension of the plaintiffs domain name under the NSI policy after the domainname registrant had invested $15 million in developing an online service with 500,000 subscribers). Regarding the flaws in NSI's policy generally, see, for example, Maher, supra
note 43; Gigante, supra note 63; Carl Oppedahl, Analysis and Suggestions RegardingNSI
Domain Name Trade Mark Dispute Policy (last modified Sept. 8, 1996) <http'/
www.patents.com/nsi/iip.sht>.
68. Postel, supra note 11, l 1.5.
69. Generally, "a trademark is recognized as having a separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally recognized as a mark." 4 J. THoMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrrION § 29.1, at p. 29-4 (4th ed.
1996). Thus, the legitimate owner of a mark in one country cannot use it in another country where the same mark belongs to a different owner.
70. See Foster, supra note 9. The German commercial court issued an ex parte restraining order, finding that the Internet use and other factors evinced an intent to infringe
the German mark. Telephone Interview with Thomas Hofmann, Esq., the United States
Attorney for the American defendant. No further information is available, because the parties' settlement prohibits disclosure of any details about the case. E-mail message from
William Foster to the author (transmitted Nov. 22, 1996) (on file with author and Journal
of Computer & Information Law). See also Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that magazine images available on Italian
Internet site violated 15-year-old trademark injunction against distribution of magazine in
the United States).
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owners of the SCRABBLE mark have recently clashed over the former's
use of SCRABBLE on its Web site which,
naturally, is accessible in the
71
latter's exclusive trademark territory.
2. Internet Groups' Response to the Conflict
Until recently, the Internet engineering groups have dismissed
these issues as problems created by lawyers, 72 insisting that they never
intended domain names to be trademarks, 73 and ignoring the growing
body of legal opinion that domain names are a species of trademark.7 4 In
71. See Mattel, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 96-7635 IH (RCX) (C.D. Cal.), first amended
complaint, filed Dec. 11, 1996 (charging, among other claims, that the Web site constitutes
trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and international
trademark agreements). The defendant, Hasbro, Inc., owns the United States and
Canadian rights to the SCRABBLE name and markets the game through its Milton
Bradley division. Id. See also Scrabble@, The Official Milton Bradley Website (visited Jan.
22, 1997) <http./www.scrabble.com/aol/home.html>. In late 1996, Hasbro established
the scrabble site at ,http://www. scrabble.com>. Anyone accessing the site
<httpwww.scrabble.com> gets the following message:
THE MATERIALS IN THE MILTON BRADLEY SCRABBLE.COM SITE ARE
PRESENTED SOLELY FOR USERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
AND ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING SALES OF SCRABBLE ®
BRAND CROSSWORD GAME PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA. BY CLICKING ON THE "OK" BUTTON, YOU AGREE TO THESE
RESTRICTIONS AND REPRESENT THAT YOU ARE CURRENTLY LOCATED
IN THE UNITED STATES OR CANADA.
Id. However, nothing prevents--or can prevent-a user outside the United States and
Canada from clicking "OK" to access the "Official SCRABBLE ® Homepage." Id.
Hasbro and the European owner, the plaintiff Mattel, are attempting to settle their
dispute. Hasbro has been unwilling to discuss the matter for fear of jeopardizing the settlement negotiations.
72. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 43, at 7 (arguing that the application of trademark
law is an undesirable burden); Mockapetris, supra note 43 (arguing that the involvement of
lawyers means less flexibility and less Internet growth); Maher, supra note 43, at 13 (stating that there is a concern for avoiding litigation by finding an entity that is immune from
litigation).
73. Postel, supra note 11, at
1.7, A.1.1., A.1.4.1.
74. See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 1996 WL 84853
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (entering a preliminary injunction in favor of Hasbro, Inc., and enjoining Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd. from using the name "CANDYLAND" or any
similar name in connection with any Internet site); Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris,
Inc., No. 96-01213-WMB (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996) (preliminary injunction enjoining plaintiff from using juris" domain name on ground that it infringed defendant's registered
"JURIS"trademark); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Sunriver Corp., No. C-95 02340-CAL (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 28, 1995) (entering a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from using
"SUNRIVER" mark as, among other things, a domain name on the ground that it infringed
plaintiffs many "SUN-" trademarks). One of the earliest court decisions to address the
issue declared that "[a] domain name mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a customer base." MTV Networks v. Curry,
867 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See also, e.g., Richard Raysman & Peter Brown,
Domain Names: Protecting Trademarkson the Internet, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 1996, at 3 (not-
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the fall of 1996, IANA floated a plan to "solve" the problem of domainname conflicts in the .com iTLD by flooding the Internet with a host of
new, competing iTLDs and franchising private registries for the new
iTLDs. 75 IANA's proposal ignored the trademark community's prediction that multiple iTLDs would only create multiple venues for trademark disputes. 76 LANA also drew criticism from segments of the
Internet community concerned that its plan to create new iTLDs was a
"quick fix" hastily conceived without careful consideration of all its
ramifications.

77

The reaction to IANA's plan prompted IANA and ISOC in November
199678 to join with several other bodies-including the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") and the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU)-to form an International Ad Hoc Committee
("IAHC") to study the problem and devise a comprehensive solution. 79 In
February 1997, the IAHC issued a final report endorsing the concept of
multiple iTLDs, but within a more textured, nuanced framework. 0
Among the highlights of the IAHC proposal:
81
(1) the creation of seven new iTLDs
ing that unlike the traditional trademark environment, where identical trademarks can
coexist in different markets, in the current domain name system a trademark can only be
used in a single domain name); Dan L. Burk, A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RIcH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1995), <httpJ/www.urich.edu/-joltlvlil/burk.html>
(visited Jan. 24, 1997) (explaining the development of litigation and trademark disputes on
the Internet); Jonathan Agmon & Stacey Halpern, The Relationship Between Domain
Names and Trademarks (visited Jan. 24, 1997) <httpJ/www.1U.georgetown.edu/ lc/internic/
introdl.html> (discussing NSI's dispute policy); Maher, supra note 43.
75. Postel, supra note 11.
76. 1995 Harvard Project, supra note 43 (noting the remarks of Robert Frank and Robert Moskowitz). As recently as March 1994, IANA declared that "1ilt is extremely unlikely
that other TLDs [in addition to .edu, .com, net, .org, .gov, .mil, and .int] will be created."
Domain Name System Structure & Delegation, (visited Jan. 22, 1997) <http://
ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1591.txt>.
77. Mitchell, supra note 29.
78. See New InternationalCommittee Named to Resolve DomainName System (visited
Nov. 12, 1996) <http//www.iahc.org/iahcmembers.html>. See also IAHC Final Report,
supra note 58, 1 1.
79. International Internet Ad Hoc Committee (visited Jan. 24, 1997) <httpj/
www.iahc.org>. The International Trademark Association, the IAB and the FNC are also
members of the IAHC. Id. As is the wont of these self-appointed Internet groups, the
IAHC declares-without any citation of authority-that iTLDs are within its "purview."
Id. at Executive Summary.
80. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58. The IAHC's proposal substitutes the term "generic Top-Level Domain" for international Top-Level Domain. To spare the reader from
learning yet another Internet acronym, this article will continue to use iTLD to refer to
such domain.
81. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 9 3.1.
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(2) the establishment of multiple domain-name registrars worldwide, with each registrar empowered to register names in all the
82
iTLDs
(3) the optional posting of new domain-name applications for 60
days on the3 Internet to allow affected parties an opportunity to comment
8
or protest
(4) the creation of an iTLD and national TLDs in which trademark
84
owners could register trademark-specific domain names
(5) the requirement that domain-name registrants consent, as a
condition of registration, to mandatory WIPO mediation and arbitration
of name disputes at the discretion of the party challenging the domain
85
name
(6) the creation of a directory for the trademark-specific domains
that would allow users to access sites using the trademark as an
86
identifier
The IAHC proposal goes a long way toward addressing the problems
of the current DNS, but still does not solve the core issue of legal authority. As its name indicates, the IAHC is an ad hoc organization. Several
of its constituent members are themselves ad hoc entities.8 7 Thus, as
with all the other Internet groups, the private sector's acquiescence is
critical to the IAHC's assumption of the role of overall Internet governing body. However, such acquiescence is unlikely where the IAHC
system threatens fundamental rights.8 8
82. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 4.2.
83. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, Executive Summary,
7.1.3, 7.2.2. See Gigante, supra note 65, first proposing such a notice period for new domain names modeled
on the PTO's practice for trademark applications.
84. IAHC Final Report, note 58, 9 8.2 et seq.
85. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 7.1.1.
86. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, $ 8.2.3. See Gigante, supra note 65 (proposing
such a directory system as a means of allowing multiple uses of trademarks as domain
names).
87. For example, the ISOC, IAB and FNC.
88. See Network Solutions' PreliminaryResponse to the IAHC's Draft Specificationsfor
the Administration and Management of gTLDs (visited Feb. 23, 1997) <http:/l
info.netsol.com/announcements/011497.html>, in which NSI, commenting on an earlier
draft of the IAHC proposal, stated the following:
no one has the legal basis, delegated by statute or otherwise, to oversee and direct
the affairs of the Internet. Without legal mandate, the Committee must seek and
obtain consensus for its actions. The membership of the [International Ad Hoc]
Committee, with its broad constituency, may be an organization which can bring
the various constituencies to consensus. That consensus, however, must be consistent with the needs of the Internet's customers. As a key stakeholder and participant, we realize that our consensus is also needed. We will assist and participate
in helping to form that consensus. Make no mistake, the Committee may make
decisions which will forever effect [sic] the way the Internet operates.
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The IAHC's proposal regarding domain-name disputes is one area
that could erode the current consensus by acquiescence. The plan requires a domain-name registrant to submit to mediation and arbitration
under WIPO's rules at the discretion of the party challenging the domain
name. Although the IAHC plan is in part an attempt to relieve the pressure created by the exponential growth of the .com iTLD,8 9 conditioning
registration in the new iTLD's on consent to mandatory WIPO mediation/arbitration will probably mean that many registrants will continue
to opt for a .com registration, rather than submit to mandatory mediation or arbitration.90 This likely reaction by registrants will defeat the
IAHC's stated purpose of increasing competition and access for the
global Internet community. 9 1 The IAHC proposal would therefore appear to raise both due-process and antitrust issues that a disgruntled
registrant could use to challenge the IAHC's authority to promulgate
92
such rules.

Thus, for example, if a court were to hold that a particular Internet
group's activities constituted state action (see supra text accompanying
notes 57-62), the group would have to conform its practices to constitutional standards. 93 A domain-name registrant might be entitled to a
(Emphasis added.) See also What Does Network Solutions Want, and What Will it Get?,
Info. L. Alert, Feb. 14, 1997, at 1, (observing that the IAHC "derives its authority from
nowhere and no one," and reporting that NSI is asserting certain, undefined proprietary
rights in the .com database).
89. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 3.2.1.
90. The IAHC's proposal of course does not state the basis for its authority to condition
access to the Internet on the registrant's surrender of its right to seek judicial protection in
the event of a domain-name dispute.
91. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 3.2.1. The IAHC does envision bringing the
existing iTLDs - .com, .net and .int - under the same rules on expiration of the current
cooperative agreement between NSI and the NSF (see supra note 36). See Seven New Top
Level Domain Names Are Added for Internet Addresses and Up to 28 New Registrars
Planned, Feb. 4, 1997 (visited Feb. 19, 1997) <http://www.iahc.org/press-final.html>.
92. The IAHC proposal notably avoids the issue of who-if anybody-has proprietary
rights in the existing name space. See text accompanying supra notes 57-59. The proposal
merely accepts as a given, and without explanation, that "[t]he Internet top level domain
space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust." IAHC Final Report, supra note
58, Executive Summary. Compare supra text accompanying notes 57 and 58; 1995
Harvard Project, supra note 43 (noting the remarks of Anthony Rutkowski regarding the
conflicting claims of the United States government and Internet service providers in the
name space).
93. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) ("It surely cannot be that
government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed by the
Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form."); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 613, 620 (1991) ("[g]overnmental authority may dominate a[ I [private]
activity to such an extent that its participants may be deemed to act with the authority of
the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional restraints.").
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due-process hearing in the event of any dispute over the domain name. 94
The IAHC requirement of consent to mandatory mediation and arbitration under WIPO's auspices, if state action, thus might violate due-process standards.
The Internet groups would not necessarily fare better if held to be
private actors. Antitrust might be one problematic area. Although the
Internet groups continue to see themselves as "public trustees," the
IAHC's plan to franchise several dozen private registrars for the new
iTLDs will place these groups squarely in commerce. 9 5 With their selfproclaimed authority to enfranchise new, territorially ensconced iTLD
registrars, on the one hand, and, on the other, their ability to impede the
development of alternative domain-name systems, 96 the Internet groups
could face charges that they are engaging in anti-competitive conduct.
The focal point for such charges would likely be the Council of Registrars ("CORE"), a body comprised of all IAHC-authorized iTLD registrars, to be established under the IAHC's proposal. 9 7 According to the
IAHC, all CORE members will be signatories to a memorandum of understanding that will provide [sic] "the necessary contractual, legal,
oversight and public policy framework under which CORE and the Individual Registrars must operate."98 CORE's Executive Committeeelected by the member registrars and "coordinate activities among the
registrars . .

.99

Given the incestuous relationship that will exist between the registrars and the other Internet groups, as well as the mandatory signature
of all registrars to the CORE memorandum of understanding, CORE
would probably be deemed a horizontal agreement for antitrust purposes, i.e., an agreement between competitors or potential competitors. 10 0 The IAHC's plan to designate a limited number of registrars in
defined territories-coupled with requirements (like mandatory media94. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, (1988);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1982). Under the present system,
if NSI were held to be a state actor, it might have to afford a registrant such a hearing to
answer a trademark owner's complaint before taking any action to suspend the registrant's
domain name.
95. See IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 9 4.1.4 (requiring a $20,000 fee for each
approved registrar). C.f Shaw, supra note 1; Postel, supra note 11, 91A.3.
96. See, e.g., Alternic.nic Network Information Center (visited Jan. 22, 1997) <httpl/
www.alternic.net> (describing of how an alternate registry system must operate within the
interstices of the dominant TCP/IP protocol).
97. See IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 99 5.1.1-6.1.2.
98. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 9 5.1.1.
99. IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, 9 5.1.2.
100. See, United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See also 1 JULAN 0. VON KALINowsKI, ET AL., ANTrrRUsT
LAws AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 11.01[1], 14.02 (2d ed. 1996) ("voN KALINowsm").
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tion/arbitration) that encourage registrants to act cooperatively-might
then constitute a per se illegal horizontal allocation of markets. 10 1 Further, as now envisioned, CORE and particularly CORE's Executive Committee will function as something analogous to an industry association.
Yet the IAHC proposal lacks any controls to guard against a danger inand other competitive
herent in such associations: the exchange of price
10 2
information in violation of the antitrust laws.
Moreover, although the IAHC plan laudably reflects, for the first
time, sensitivity to the international implications of decisions affecting
Internet governance, the imprimatur of this latest ad hoc Internet group
does not guarantee international acceptance of the proposed iTLD regime. The European Union ("EU"), in particular, has become increasingly distressed over American domination of Internet content' 0 3 and
administration.1 0 4 On November 20, 1996, the European Commission
issued a "Green Paper" on telecommunications which, among other
things, expressed disquiet that "some of the most significant global domains are administered by a private company [viz: NSI] in the U.S."105
The same disquiet may greet the IAHC's efforts, given its American flavor 10 6 and the EU's desire for a greater European voice in the adminis10 7
tration of the Internet.
101. See, e.g., Topco 405 U.S. 596; Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951) (allocation of world markets between United States and foreign companies a
violation of American antitrust law). Under United States law, a horizontal allocation of
markets is illegal even though there is no proof of price-fixing or other anticompetitive
conduct. E.g., Topco; Palmer v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 46, (1990); 1 VON KALINowsu § 14.02, at
14-5. Such a market allocation would also violate European Union antitrust law. 8 VON
KALiowsiu § 60.04.
102. See 1 VON KALiNowsi §§ 11.0212][ii], 13.04.
103. See, e.g., John Browning, Television By Any Other Name, ScL AxMxR., Oct., 1996, at
40 (reporting that the European Union intends to require Internet transmissions to comply
with the minimum European content restrictions applicable to television programming);
Bernard Cassen, Le Tout-Anglais N'est Pas Une Fatalitd,LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May
1996, at 18 (decrying the English language's predominance on the Internet as "cultural
imperialism").
104. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 43; see also 1995 Harvard Project, supra note 43 (including the remarks of Daniel Karrenberg and David Conrad).
105. Commission of the European Communities, Towards A European Numbering Environment: Green Paper on a Numbering Policy for Telecommunications Services in Europe 23 (1996), available in Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on a
Numbering Policy for Telecommunications (visited Jan. 24, 1997) <httpJ/europa.eu.int/en/
record/green/gp9611/index.htm>.
106. Even the IAHC's "international" representatives from WIPO (Albert Tramposch)
and the ITU (Robert Shaw) are U.S. citizens.
107. The EU's "Green Paper" (see supra text accompanying note 104) suggests more
governmental regulation of the iTLDs:
In the Green Paper, the Commission also addresses the issue of assignment of
Internet names and addresses. These functions have been transferred to private
companies, the largest of which are located in the United States, that are paid for
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For similar reasons, the IAHC's imprimatur will not necessarily insulate a registrant in one of the new iTLDs from liability abroad, for
example, trademark infringement.1 0 8 Nothing in the IAHC's proposed
new iTLD system shields a domain-name against being sued for trademark infringement. The defendant domain-name registrant might, in
turn, try to implead the registrar that issued it the name. IAHC, IANA
and CORE-the groups that would be controlling the name space de
facto-might also find themselves drawn into the litigation by either the
domain-name registrant or the impleaded registrar.
In addition to conflicting international regulation, the IAHC plan
also fails to address the prospect of conflicting regulation within the
United States. State public utility commissions could have authority in
some instances to fill the gap left by the federal government, thereby
subjecting the Internet to a patchwork of state regulation.1 0 9 States may
try to regulate Internet activities by legislative action too, as has already
occurred in several jurisdictions.' 1 0 Under these circumstances, the In-

this service; companies are beginning to fight over particular names, and mechanisms for settling such disputes are inadequate. For all these reasons, the Commission calls on interested parties to submit observations concerning possible

regulatory intervention by the European Union.
Eur. Rep., Nov. 23, 1996, 1996 WL 11075102.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 70 and 71 (regarding international trademark
liability arising from use of names on Web sites). See also Playboy (holding that magazine
images available on Italian Internet site violated 15-year-old trademark injunction against
distribution of magazine in the United States). Regarding international trademark liability arising from domain names registered in an iTLD, see, for example, Maher, supra note
43; Andr6 Brunel, TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR INTERNET DOMAIN NAMEs, IN THE INTERNET
AND BusINEss: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL IssuEs n.29 (Computer Law
Association ed., 1996), available in Andrd Brunel, TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR INTERNET
DoMAIN NAMEs, n.29 (visited Jan. 24, 1996) <httpI/cla.org/RuhBook/chp3.htm>; Legislation: Two Days of Hearings on NI Bill Consider ProviderLiability and FairUse, 51 Pat.,
Trademark & Copyright. J. (BNA) 484 (Feb. 15, 1996) (reporting the congressional testimony of an International Trademark Association representative on the Internet's potential
for generating global trademark abuse).
109. See Maher, supra note 43; see also 1995 Harvard Project, supra note 43 (regarding
the remarks of Anthony Rutkowski).
110. See GA. ST. ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (1996), which makes it a misdemeanor to "knowingly
... transmit any data through a computer network.., if such data uses any individual
name, trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol
to falsely identify the person, organization, or representative transmitting such data." Arguably, knowingly using a domain name that is the same as a registered mark would violate this statute, even though the domain-name registrant might have the right to use the
name under civil trademark law. See also Minnesota Attorney General's Warning to All
Internet Users and Providers, (visited Jan. 24, 1996) <http'//www.state.mn.us/ebranch/ag/
memo.txt> (declaring that the Minnesota's civil and criminal laws apply to Internet transmissions received in the state from anywhere on the Internet).
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ternet community's expressed desire to be rid of federal involvement' 1 '
recalls the Chinese proverb that admonishes us to wish with care, lest
our wish might be granted.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERNET'S FUTURE GOVERNANCE
The IAHC's proposal is a positive development insofar as it reflects a
matured recognition that Internet governance must be rationalized if it
is to function in the new environment created by the federal government's withdrawal. However, as the above discussion shows, the selfappointed IAHC can no more avoid the fundamental problem of lack of
authority than can its constituent members. In fact, in attempting to
address Internet governance at the international level, the IAHC will
only exacerbate the authority problem, as other legal systems undoubtedly will be called upon to evaluate the powers of the IAHC and other
Internet groups according to their own jurisprudence. Thus, without a
comprehen-sive framework based on accepted legal norms, the Internet
will likely face piecemeal and inconsistent regulation by legislative and
judicial action in the several United States states and in States around
the world. "1 2 Without the protection of their erstwhile federal sponsors,
the Internet groups may find that a court hearing a challenge to their
authority will fashion an Internet structure quite different from that to
which they are accustomed. Some legislative action could avoid this
prospect and place the Internet's administration on a healthy legal footing for the next stage of its development:
(1) clarify the legal character of the name space; 113
(2) clarify the jurisdiction and authority of those Internet groups
deemed necessary for Internet administration;
(3) to the extent determined appropriate, provide the sanctioned Internet groups with carefully prescribed immunity from antitrust liability, as well as from vicarious and contributory liability under copyright,
111. See 1995 Harvard Project, supra note 43 (containing the remarks of Paul Mockapetris, Paul Vixie, David Conrad and Jeffrey Ritter).
112. "Inevitably, lawyers from different traditions will approach the issues of transborder data flows ("TBDF") in ways dictated by their training. Concepts will differ, institutions will differ, categories of legal reference will be different . .." M.D. Kirby, Legal
Aspects of Information Technology, in AN EXPLORATION OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 12 (Report of the Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 1983). See also id. at 40. Cf. Perritt, supra note 7, at 352-53.
113. Calling the name space a "public trust," IAHC Final Report, supra note 58, at Executive Summary, begs the question. What laws define the fiduciary duties of the trust's
self-appointed trustees? What social groups comprise the "public" for whom these trustees

presume to act?
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trademark and patent laws;' 1 4
(4) confer on a single federal agency-be it the NSF, the FNC or a
new entity-the statutory authority to act as liaison with the sanctioned
Internet groups, make recommendations to the executive and legislative
branches on Internet administration and represent the United States
with respect to international efforts to coordinate the administration of
Internet activities; and
(5) preempt state and local regulation of Internet administration,
and state and local jurisdiction over claims concerning trademarks, trade
names and domain names arising from interstate or foreign Internet
transmissions. 115
More ambitiously, on the global scale, the Internet needs international agreement on the structure of Internet governance."i 6 As an example of just one troublesome question that might require an
international solution, the United States government's claim to a proprietary interest in the domain name space remains unresolved." 7 If the
United States government still claims such proprietary rights, it will find
itself in conflict with the EU and other foreign governments." 8 Clear
statutory authority under United States law will be essential for any Internet group or federal liaison agency to be able to deal effectively with
foreign governments on this and analogous issues.
Some in the Internet community will resist any real-world effort at
legislation or international agreements. They hope instead that the Internet will somehow develop its own globally accepted common law." 9
Experience suggests otherwise.
Although the Internet is a unique medium, in some ways its current
problems are not much different from those plaguing the early days of
radio. In the decade after World War I, radio broadcasting-like the Internet today-grew exponentially.' 20 Except for the military and ship114. See Network Solutions Willing to Consider Scrapping Its Policy in Return for Im.
munity from Litigation, INFO. L. ALERT, Nov. 22, 1996, at 1 (reporting that NSI would remove itself from all domain-name disputes if it could obtain statutory immunity from
contributory infringement claims by trademark owners aggrieved over NSI's registration of
a domain name); Gigante, supra note 65 (proposing such immunity for NSI and other
registries).
115. See supra note 110, at 548-62 (describing troublesome regulation by the states).
116. Gigante, supra note 63, at 548-62 (proposing a treaty to avoid international conflicts over Internet content).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07. See also 1995 Harvard Project, supra
note 43 (containing the remarks of David Conrad).
119. See, e.g., David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, (visited Jan. 24, 1997) <http'J/www.cli.org/X0025_LBFIN.html>.
120. See Edward F. Sarno, Jr., The National Radio Conferences, reprinted in LAWRENCE
W. LIcHTr & MALAcm C. TOPPING, AMERICAN BROADCASTING: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE His-
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ping uses of radio, the federal government initially maintained a handsoff policy, limiting itself to issuing station licenses through the Department of Commerce. 12 1 By the mid-1920's, the radiowaves were in a state
of anarchy, with amateur users and national and local commercial sta22
tions broadcasting on and interfering with each other's frequencies.'
After several court decisions held that the Department of Commerce
could not use its ministerial licensing authority to regulate the interference problem,' 23 the Department tried to obtain voluntary compliance
through a series of government-sponsored radio conferences between
1922 and 1925.124 However, the conflicting interests of the different
broadcasting groups forestalled any consensus. "The result was confu25
sion and chaos."'
Finally, in 1927, Congress passed the Radio Control Act, which established the Federal Radio Commission, the F.C.C.'s precursor, to bring
order to radio broadcasting.' 2 6 Despite resistance to any government
role from segments of the broadcasting community, the imposition of
regulatory order hardly stifled growth in the cyberspace of its day-what
was then called the "ether." The following decade of the 1930's is generally recognized as radio's golden age.
The Internet does not face the problem of a limited frequency spectrum that confronted early radio broadcasting. In theory, the TCP/IP
protocol can be adjusted to allow for as many domain names as necessary
to accommodate all users wanting Internet sites. However, because domain names are unique, when several users compete for the same name,
the situation is analogous to different radio broadcasters trying to broadcast on the same frequency. As the experience with radio suggests, it is
unlikely that a commercial enterprise will voluntarily surrender its
claim to a desirable resource, be it a radio frequency or a domain name,
especially when, in the case of a domain name, the name or an associated
534, at 536 (1975); Marvin R. Bensman, Regulation of
Broadcasting By the Department of Commerce 1921-1927, reprinted in LAWRENCE W.
LICHTY & MALACHI C. TOPPING, AMERICAN BROADCASTING: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE HISTORY

TORY OF RADIO AND TELEVISION

OF RADIO AND TELEVISION 548, 553. See also N.B.C., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,

210-12 (1943).
121.

See LIcHwr & TOPPING, supra note 120, at 527-28; BENSMAN, supra note 120, at

547.
122. See BENSMAN, supra note 120, at 547-48, 553-54; N.B.C., 319 U.S. at 211.
123. See BENSMAN, supra note 120, at 548-49, 553-54; N.B.C., 319 U.S. at 212.
124. See SARNO, supra note 120, at 537, 539-41. See generally N.B.C., 319 U.S. at 21013, for a comprehensive discussion of radio's early travails and the Commerce Department's futile efforts to bring order to the broadcasting world.
125. N.B.C., 319 U.S. at 212.
126. See LICHTY & TOPPING, supra note 120, at 529-30; BENSMAN, supra note 121, at
555; W. JEFFERSON DAVIS, The Radio Act of 1927, reprinted in LICHTY & TOPPING, supra
note 120, at 556; N.B.C., 319 U.S. at 213.
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trademark represents the enterprise's valuable good will developed
through years of promotional efforts. Only a statutory scheme can sort
out such conflicting claims and impart some order.
V. CONCLUSION
The current organization of the Internet is unprecedented, consisting of self-appointed ad hoc groups that, though neither possessing statutory authority nor subject to regulation, make vital decisions affecting
what is already a significant channel of interstate and international communication. Because these groups evolved in an environment of federally sponsored research, which did not require the Internet groups to
consider the legal ramifications of their decisions, today's Internet operates in a legal void. This void threatens the Internet's further development because it may be filled with confusing and inconsistent regulation
by territorially based governments in the United States and around the
globe.
Admiration for the accomplishments of the Internet groups therefore
should not impede discussion of whether the existing Internet organization is suitable for administering the next level of the Internet's development. 12 7 That development will be primarily commercial and the
experience with radio broadcasting teaches that in a pure laissez-faire
environment, competing commercial interests will battle over unique or
limited resources-like domain names-in ways that may harm the medium's growth. The Internet thus urgently requires an organization
based on a normative structure that addresses these issues on the national and international levels.

127. Albeit with probably a different structure in mind, IANA itself acknowledges the
need for more orderliness: "As the net becomes larger and more commercial, the LANA
needs a formal body to accept responsibility for the legal issues which arise surrounding
DNS policy and its implementation." Postel, supra note 11, $ 1.5.3. See also Anthony M.
Rutkowski, Internet Names and Numbers: Toward a Viable Regime (last modified June 3,
1996) <http:"/www.wia.org/pub/internet-issues.html>.

